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The research aims to understand the impact of the internal factors on the formulation of a 
policy of selective opening of the Russian economy since the beginning of the transition. We study the 
politico-economic configuration in Russia in terms of (i) its "vertical" dimension (relations federal 
centre  -  regions)  and  (ii)  the  "horizontal"  one  (relations  between  state  and  firms).  We  show  the 
fragmentation of the central state as regards to both dimensions during the first period (1991-1999). 
During the second period (since 2000), the reforms aim to reinforce the "vertical of power" and to 
institutionalize the state-enterprises relations. Nevertheless, questions emerge as to the effectiveness 
and continuity of the state's return strength. This evolution also appears through the study of Russian 
trade  policy,  which  has  submitted  to  private  interests  in  1991-1998  and  stabilized  afterwards. 















In the beginning of the 1990s, Russia had to deal with a double challenge. Firstly, it 
was moving from the command system to a capitalist market economy, and secondly, from a 
relatively closed economy towards integrating the globalizing world economy. This double 
challenge raised questions relative to the allocation of property rights over assets and of the 
configuration of relations between the state and the private sector. The main objective of this 
research is to understand the impact of the internal factors on the formulation of a policy of 
selective opening of the Russian economy since the beginning of the transition. 
We use the approach of international political economy. The decisions related to the 
opening of the Russian economy should be analysed in light of internal factors (i.e. dominant 
groups of interests). The latter reflect factor (Rogowski, 1989) or industrial (Milner, 1988) 
preferences upon the trade policy outcome. Further, as policy demands pass through public 
institutions,  the  institutional  structure  of  the  decision-making  process  should  also  be 
considered.  In  this  paper,  we  study  the  link  between  politico-economic  configuration  in 
Russia since the beginning of the transition reforms and mode of its international integration 
aiming to apply the international political economy analytical framework.  
In section 1, we study the general configuration of relations between executive and 
legislative  power  and  civil  society.  We  show  the  dominance  of  individualised  relations 
between economic agents within executive bodies, thus invalidating political economy models 
based on hypothesis of promotion of collective (group) interests.  
In sections 2 and 3, we present a political economy view of Russian state in terms of 
(i) its "vertical" dimension (relations federal centre - regions) and (ii) the "horizontal" one 
(relations between state and firms). We distinguish two periods, that is, 1991-1999 and 2000-
present, the political changes (notably, the arrival of the Putin administration in 1999) being 
considered as a breaking point. During the first period, we observe the fragmentation of the 
central state as regards to both dimensions. With the ability to exercise influence over the 
regulatory decisions of central and regional public authorities within an uncertain institutional 
context,  firms  may  implement  strategies  of  asset  stripping  and  cash  stripping.  This 
distribution of forces is questioned at the end of the 1990s with the post-crisis recovery and 
the arrival of V. Putin into power in 1999. During the second period (since 2000), the reforms 
aim to reinforce the "vertical of power" and to institutionalize the state-enterprise relations. 
The private strategies are submitted to the realization of the “national” interest. The state 
reinforces  control  over  natural  resources  and  other  strategic  industries,  i.e.,  automobiles. 
Nevertheless, resistances persist, and questions emerge as to effectiveness and continuity of 
the state's return strength. 
In section 3, we observe these tendencies through the evolution of the Russian trade 
policy, weakened by private interests in 1991-1998 and being stabilized since 1999-2000. 
Nevertheless, as proven by international specialization indicators, until present, Russia has not 
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1. Individualized lobbying within thе executive power 
Russian political-institutional system is characterized by the dominance of executive 
power and a weakly-developed civil society. 
The role of the Parliament has been weakened since the 1993 crisis (Roche, 2000). At 
that period, the Parliament (Supreme council of the RSFSR, elected in the soviet period)
1 was 
opposing to radical economic reforms. It denounced privatization as a form of asset stripping 
and criticized monetarist approach (restricted budgetary expenses) of the government. The 
culmination came in summer 1993, while the inflation peaked at 30% rate on a monthly basis, 
the workers' discontent was growing and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) suspended a 
credit tranche by arguing that the reforms were too slow. One can note that the Parliament 
was composed mainly from intelligentsia (53,5% of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet of 1991 
according to the sociologist O. Krychtanovskaya, 2005), while nomenklatura mostly searched 
access to the executive bodies where main power resources had been concentrated
2.  
Paradoxically, at that moment, the President possessed strong public popularity. The 
revocation of the Parliament (September, 1993) provided him Occidental support and promise 
of financial assistance
3. The confrontation was solved in October by the assault of Parliament, 
the latter not accepting to resign. 
In  result,  the  Constitution  adopted  by  referendum  of  December,  1993  granted  large 
power to the President, hence consolidating the personal power of B. Yeltsin 
4. Also, in this 
way,  radical  reforms  could  be  re-launched  according  to  the  IMF  prescriptions  and  that, 
without the mandate from the population. One can consider the reformist party of Ye. Gaidar 
gathered only 15% of votes at the parliamentary elections hold on the same day with the 
Constitution referendum
5. The regional leaders' elections were suspended de facto until 1996
6. 
So, Roche (2000) evokes a "confiscated democracy". 
In  theory,  such  situation  reveals  the  link  between  political  regimes  (democracy  or 
authoritarian state) and the pursuit of reforms. The J-curve model describes the distribution of 
                                                 
1 RSFSR stands for Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. 
2 Krychtanovskaya (2005: 148). The intelligentsia means the social class engaged in complex mental or 
creative labor, while the nomenklatura occupied various administrative positions in the Soviet Union. 
3 The coincident victory of the Communist party in parliamentary elections in Poland could possibly 
contribute to the IMF decision to support Yeltsin (Reddaway, Glinski, 2001: 417). 
4 That is, not only legal competences of the President face to the Parliament (the right to dissolve the 
Parliament of it doesn't accept for the third time consecutively the candidature of the Prime Minister, the right to 
dismiss the government and to nominate federal ministers, etc), but also increased personal power of B. Yeltsin. 
While fixing in Constitution the end of the presidential mandate for June, 1996, he withdraws his decision to run 
the presidential campaign in June, 1994. In fact, the popularity of Yeltsin was decreasing. In November, 1993, 
48% of the population were unsatisfied by the performances of the President since the October events, only 25% 
were satisfied and 27% had no answer. Roche (2000: 209-210). 
5 In total, liberals receive about 30% of votes (of which 7,83% for "Yabloko" of G. Yavlinski opposing to 
the shock therapy), the left wing gets 28% (of which the Communist Party 12,35%), and the liberal-demoscratic 
party of V. Zhirinovsky (extreme right) gathers 22,79%. The remainder is shared between several parties of 
lesser importance. Roche (2000: 219). 
In 1995, the party of power ("Our home is Russia" of V. Chernomyrdin) got only about 10% of suffrages, 
while the left-wing parties received about 32% of votes. Krychtanovskaya (2005: 158). 
6 Elections were prohibited in November 1991-November 1992, further the moratorium was extended for 
one year. In 1991-1992, Yeltsin nominated 70 regional leaders and about 50% of regional leaders had to leave 
their functions. However,  while centrifugal tendencies in the regions were getting stronger,  the Parliament 
reduced the presidential competences to influence nominations in the regions. After the assault of the Parliament, 
governmental elections had been formally prohibited until the inauguration of the new Parliament, but in fact, 
their organization had been blocked until 1996, with rare exceptions. See Krychtanovskaya, 2005.   4 
gains and losses from the reforms
7. It supposes that the benefits from reforms are diffused in 
space  and  postponed  in  time,  while  the  losses  are  concentrated  on  precise  groups  (for 
example, pensioners and public sector workers) and coincides in time with the reforms. So, in 
democratic regimes, losers are supposed to counteract the reforms. Therefore, radical reforms 
can be realized only by a government which is autonomous from its electorate in the short 
term. 
In  this  context,  Russian  civil  society  stays  relatively  passive.  Firstly,  one  should 
remember the quasi-inexistence of the democratic tradition in Russia which is limited to the 
constitutional  monarchy  experience  in  1905-1917,  and  a  strong  personification  of  power 
typical for Russian political system. Secondly, Russia inherited soviet paternalist structures 
where  workers  were  dependent  from  their  enterprises  (notably,  for  the  delivery  of  social 
services). Finally, the past totalitarian control – not admitting independent organizations – 
entailed  the  atomization  of  society,  the  latter  being  reinforced  by  the  economic  troubles. 
Therefore, the population adapts itself to "top-down" reforms. Moreover, the economic crisis 
discredits new institutions and entails strategies of individual survival while distancing the 
populace from political institutions. 
While the executive power is dominating over the legislative power, its decisions are 
highly influenced by firms. Precisely, the emerging system is characterized by personalized 
relations between enterprises (taken in isolation) and public decision makers, as opposed to 
the collective representation of interests of groups of enterprises (industries). In fact, the high 
concentration  of  soviet  industry  and  initial  stage  of  development  of  private  enterprise  in 
Russia in the beginning of the 1990s explain, firstly, a "unitary" representation of economic 
interests  and,  secondly,  multiplicity  of  interests  (strategies)  of  actors,  not  yet  achieved 
convergence of interests on a sectoral basis. 
The system of personalized lobbying entails high entry barriers (their monetary content 
is  reflected  in  the  scope  of  corruption,  while  their  relational  content  is  more  difficult  to 
measure),  which  are  practically  eliminatory  for  nascent  innovative  industries  and  small 
enterprises. As shown by Schattschneider (1960: 58), small non efficient organizations are not 
able  to  accede  a  real  political  activity  because  of  lack  of  resources  (notably,  financial 
resources). They  will remain outsiders limited to emitting pressures from outside without 
access to the initiated circle. In this way, the strongest actors (notably, those related with 
trading  activities or exports of natural resources) are privileged, while the weaker  groups 
(industries having weaker competitiveness and the whole of population) are abandoned to a 
kind of autonomous survival. 
In  other  terms,  the  tendency  is  to  (i)  private  appropriation  of  public  patrimony  (ii) 
creation of club goods
8 (assets appropriation, security of property rights, economic policy 
decisions, etc…), iii) quest for immediate  rent in the  context of high political instability. 
Correspondingly, transition in Russia authorised a high level of continuity of elites. 
In  the  next  sections,  we  will  observe  the  scope  of  individual  strategies  on  the  two 
dimensions:  i)  the  weakening  of  the  federal  centre  face  to  regions  and  ii)  the  growing 
influence of enterprises over public policy decisions.  
 
                                                 
7 See Przeworski, Adam (1991) Democracy and the Market. New York : Cambridge University Press. 
8 Club goods form an intermediate situation between private goods – goods consumed by one individual 
and only one – and collective goods – goods consumed by the whole of community and characterised by the 
non-rivalry (consumption of the good by one individual doesn't hinder its consumption by other individuals) and 
by the non-exclusion (nobody can be excluded from the consumption). Club goods are non-rival but they are 
excludable (for example, private TV channel, sport centre).   5 
 




2.1. Destruction of the common economic space 
Institutional failure in centre provides a context where regional-based nationalisms can 
mobilise themselves for promotion of their autonomy (Przeworski, 1995: 22). In Russia, the 
"parade  of  sovereignties"  activated  by  ethnic  republics  led  to  a  complex  and  asymmetric 
relations within the Federation, with immediate implications for economic policy decisions. 
 
2.1.1. Diversity of legal status and "parade of sovereignties" 
Russia inherited the territorial complexity of the Soviet Union. Russia is a federal state 
composed  of  89  Federal  subjects  (regions)  having  six  different  categories:  republic,  krai 
(territory,  county),  oblast  (region),  cities  of  federal  importance,  okrug  (circonscription) 
autonomous and oblast autonomous
910. Except if mentioned, we will use a generic term of 
"region". Russian administrative division presents several problems: 
-it doesn't necessarily respond to historico-ethnical criteria (in 1989, Russians form a 
majority in several ethno-federal unities); 
-it is not immutable (for example, Russian republic of Carelia had the status of Union 
republic until 1956, while the Crimea was transferred from Russia to Ukraine in 1954); 
-it is unequal as certain republics of Russian Federation (for example, Tatarstan) are 
comparable to newly independent Baltic countries in terms of economic size. 
Naturally,  given  such  complexity,  when  M.  Gorbachev  proposed  a  new  "treaty  of 
Union", autonomous regions of Russia (like republics of Tatarstan and Chechnya) tried to 
raise their status. In this context, B. Yeltsin, being at that time the President of the Russian 
Supreme Council and struggling to affirm Russian sovereignty face to the Union authority, 
would  have  exchanged  regional  political  support  against  enlarged  competencies  of  the 
regions.  One  can  remind  his  famous  declaration  pronounced  on  the  middle-Volga  trip  in 
August, 1990- "take as much sovereignty as you can swallow". This declaration provoked the 
so-called  "parade  of  sovereignties".  During  the  four  next  months,  19 autonomous  entities 
(republics, oblast, okrug) of Russia proclaimed their sovereignty and 4 others succeeded in 
December, 1990 – July, 1991
11. The independency tendencies soon overpassed the scope of 
ethnic regions reaching ordinary oblast (for example Sverdlovsk oblast at the Urals). At the 
same time, several regions were refusing to transfer taxes to federal budget
12. 
                                                 
9 Nowadays  (as of April 2007), there are 86 federal subjects as several regions have been regrouped. 
10 While oblast, krai and republics have a "superior" hierarchic rang, okrugs have a specific autonomous 
status within oblast or krai (except for okrug autonomous of Chukotka which is not attached to any territorial 
entity). Other particular cases are Jewish autonomous oblast and two cities of federal importance, Moscow and 
St-Petersburg. 
11 The exception is Nord-Ossetia having declared its sovereignty on July 20, 1990. 
12 For example, Republic of Yakutia was authorized to conserve the totality of perceived taxes (Radvanyi, 
2000: 89). In 1992-1993, 10% of budgetary transfers were sent to poor regions, while 90% had been sent to more 
"independentist" ethnic republics (Smith, 1999: 194). In this relation, Treisman (1999) puts forward that the 
appeasement of opposition in certain regions by financial transfers was one of the main reasons of the non-
desintegration of Russia, as compared to other post-communist federations.   6 
This process was driven by several factors, notably, the quest for control of regional 
resources and for consolidation of personal power of regional elites. Certainly, beyond these 
motivations,  regional  political  elites  were  also  looking  to  maintain  the  regional  budget 
revenues and protect ethnic populations
13. 
 
2.1.2. Distribution of competencies between the federal centre and regions 
In the Federation Treaty signed on March 31, 1992, Yeltsin accepted the principle of 
agreements (bilateral treaties) as the basis of the Federation. The Republics making part of 
Russian Federation were considered as sovereign. Further, ambiguities of relations within the 
Federation found their place within the Constitution (December, 1993). While it stipulates the 
exclusivity  of  federal  government  competences  in  numerous  domains  (establishment  of  a 
single market, financial, currency, credit and customs regulation, principles of pricing policy 
and monetary issues, foreign policy, international treaties and foreign economic relations (art. 
71)), numerous issues are submitted to the joint responsibility of the federal government and 
regional  authorities  (notably  the  use  of  subsoil  resources  (art.  72)).  Second,  while  the 
Constitution stipulates the dominance of the constitutional principle of the Federation, it also 
admits elements of contractual relations (art.66). 
In  1994-1998,  the  federal  centre  yields  ground  to  regional  elites  while  concluding 
treaties concerning the distribution of competences with more than half of the regions
14. It led 
to  a  differentiation  of  legal  frameworks  within  the  Federation,  notably,  as  for  fiscal  and 
budget issues, privatisation conditions, licences for exploitation and exports of raw materials 
and mineral products. The concluded treaties supposed more extended (Republic of Tatarstan, 
city of Moscow) or less extended competences (territory of Krasnodar, oblast of Tver) of the 
regions. In the trade domain, the concerned areas were, mainly, deliveries of authorisations, 
distribution services, exploitation of natural resources, customs procedures, reglementation of 
foreign investments (registration procedures, incitation measures), trade facilitation measures 
and environmental protection
15. 
While the federal instances disposed of branches in the regions aiming to homogenize 
the federal policy, they were influenced by regional and local administration. Moreover, legal 
norms relative to the distribution of competences could be not respected in practice, as their 
interpretation and application were left to discretion of regional public officials, and while 




2.1.3. Diversity of regional policy preferences 
Fragmentation of political and legal space contributes to the differentiation of economic 
policies between the regions, the latter consolidated by a strong differentiation of regional 
economic structures as for the resources availability, industrial structures and income level. 
                                                 
13 Gorenburg (1999) studies four Turkish republics and concludes that while concentrating the discourse 
on issues of economic advantages and sovereignty (in order to maintain Russian population), regional leaders 
promote series of measures aiming the ethnic revival of peoples. 
14 The first treaty was passed with Republic of Tatarstan in 1994 for the official reason to solve the 
conflict situation, as Tatarstan had not signed the Federation Treaty and looked for a status of a sovereign state 
"associated to Russia". Radvanyi (2000: 89).  
15 See OECD, 2003. 
16 Idem.   7 
Therefore,  regional  economic  policies  in  place  vary  from  liberalism  (for  example,  Nijni 
Novgorod) and strict interventionisme (for example, Ulianovsk). 
Economic differentiation leads to diversity of regional preferences as for the foreign 
economic policy. So, Mau and Stupin (1997) point to the role of industrial structures. They 
distinguish  three  types  of  enterprises  depending  on  size  and  efficiency:  i)  large  non 
competitive enterprises, ii) large and efficient enterprises and iii) small efficient enterprises 
having  weak  political  weight.  The  regions  where  small  efficient  enterprises  dominate  are 
more  prone  to  market  while  regions  dominated  by  large  non  efficient  enterprises  are 
submitted  to  pressures  for  protection  of  local  producers.  OECD  (1995:  52-54)  also 
distinguishes extravert and introvert regions. The former encompass  i) regions rich in natural 
resources and situated in weakly populated areas of the North and ii) principal commercial 
centres and entry points. While benefiting from integration the world market these regions 
have preferences for economic opening. The introvert regions, at their turn, are dominated by 
agro-industrial  or  military-industrial  complex.  The  agro-industrial  regions  prefer  the 
protection of local producers, while the regions dominated by military-industrial complex and 
heavy manufacturing may realize different strategies (for example, support of market reforms 
and attraction of foreign investments in order to restructure local industries, subsidies to local 
producers or integration with foreign partners or other rich regions). 
If economic fragmentation resulted from the weakness of the central state in the 1990s, 
increasing influence of regional leaders became the alternative coordination mechanism in a 
failing central state. Mendras (2003) defends that the increasing role of regional authorities let 
to  preserve  the  continuity  of  the  federal  state  (even  if  it  was  weakened),  and  to  avoid  a 
stronger destabilisation. However, regional political systems were not necessarily based on 




2.2. Towards a recentralization of the State 
The reforms of the beginning of the 2000s pursued two main goals: (i) the political one 
aiming  to  resume  powers  from  regional  governors,  and  (ii)  the  economic  one  aiming  to 
eliminate interregional barriers. 
 
2.2.1. Reinforcement of the vertical of power 
The  idea  to  modify  the  administrative  division  (already  present  since  the  Soviet 
period)
17 re-emerged after the 1998 crisis. In May 2000, the 89 regions are grouped into seven 
federal circumscriptions, each circumscription being piloted by one of the seven presidential 
representatives. The latter dispose of large (but weakly defined) competences in order to look 
after the realisation of the governmental policy at the regional level and are submitted to the 
President. They replace presidential representatives in each region which disposed of reduced 
competences and hence were inefficient to promote federal interests in regions. 
Other measures aim to reduce the influence of regional leaders: 
-  modification  of  the  representation  of  the  regions  in  the  Upper  chamber  of  the 
Parliament.  Two  delegates  (representing  the  governor  and  the  regional  legislature 
                                                 
17In the 1980s, Yu. Andropov proposed to divide the Soviet Union into 13 districts. In autumn 1998, the 
Prime Minister E. Primakov declared that 89 federal subjects is really a lot. Radvanyi (2000: 91).   8 
respectively) will rule henceforth instead of the governor and the Head of regional legislature. 
In  this  manner,  regional  leaders  loose  not  only  their  direct  influence  but  also  their 
parliamentary immunity (officially, this measure is called to restore the principle of division 
of powers); 
- introduction of the possibility for the President to revoke regional leaders and dissolve 
regional legislature in cases of violation of competences foreseen by federal legislation or 
violation of personal rights. 
Finally, in order to ease the governors' discontent, the newly created State Council of 
the Russian Federation regroups the President and governors in order to discuss issues of 
centre-regional relations. Moreover, the governors are granted the right to revoke local leaders 
(previously submitted to the presidential powers). 
However, the results of this reform are ambiguous. While the new system ameliorated 
the  communication  and  coherence  between  the  different  levels  of  the  federation,  the 
competences  of  the  presidential  representatives  are  uncertain  while  the  governors  remain 
powerful. They maintain control of regional business networks and local medias. At the same 
time,  the  conditions  for  the  dismissal  of  governors  are  very  restrictive,  and  the  Kremlin 
interventions  in  regional  and  local  electoral  campaigns  met  several  defeats.  Moreover,  it 
seems that the links between regional power and enterprises became even closer during the 
Putin presidency (Raviot, 2003). For example, several oligarchs got sieges in the Federation 
Council (Upper chamber of the Parliament)
18 and tried to occupy the posts of governors.  
Continuing reforms produced persistent opposition at the regional level. The hostage 
taking at Beslan school in September, 2004 opened a window of opportunities for the renewal 
of federal assault on the regions. A new law eliminated direct elections of the governors, 
being henceforth nominated by regional legislatures upon presentation of candidates by the 
President
19. So, even if most governors conserve actually their posts, the influence of the 
centre is consolidated. In parallel, new modifications concern the administrative division. This 
time, the issue is of mergers between border regions (notably, of okrugs autonomous with 
their "parent" regions").  
Finally,  another  dimension  of  political  reforms  consisted  to  form  a  pro-presidential 
majority at the Duma (Lower chamber of the Parliament). The "party of power"
20 of Yeltsin 
period  was  weak  from  organizational  and  ideological  point  of  view,  and  even  its  loyalty 
towards Kremlin was sometimes dubious. At the 1999 elections, the pro-presidential bloc 
"Edinstvo"  (Unity)  gathered  23,32%  of  votes,  that  is  more  than  the  precedent  "parties  of 
power" and, after merger with other fractions of the Duma, succeeded to control 54% of 
voices and 80% of the Committees. The elections of 2003 confirmed this success
21. Further, a 
reform of the electoral system hardened the conditions of political representation (aiming to 
eliminate small parties, limit the possibilities for creation of new parties, etc.) and replaces the 
mixed parliamentary system
22 by a proportional system with the passage threshold for the 
Parliament fixed at the level of 7% of votes compared to 5% previously. 
                                                 
18 Which is becoming a "lobby chamber" as qualified by L. Nevzlin (as cited in Raviot, 2003). 
19 Law 159-FZ, December 11, 2004.  
20 The weakness of political representation in Russia traduced a weak ideological consistence of political 
parties, having support of their leader for principal objective, hence the Russian expression "party of power". In 
the 1990s, it changed name and leader before the elections and was designed to represent the executive in the 
Parliament. 
21 "Edinaya Rossiya" (United Russia) gets 37,6% of votes and the constitutional majority at the Duma, 
while  the  Communist  party  gets  only  12,6%  and  right-wing  opposition  doesn't  pass  over  the  limit  of  5% 
authorizing the representation in the Parliament. Krychtanovskaya (2005: 246-254). 
22 Half of deputies represented individual districts without any conditions of party affiliation.   9 
2.2.2. Homogenization of the legal space 
Concerns about the growing heterogeneity of economic and legal space take a real form 
since the mid-1990s. Among 52 000 laws examined between 1995 and April 2001, 1000 were 
considered incompatible
23. The promulgation of laws in domains out of regional competences 
and amendment of federal laws were among the most frequent infractions
2425. 
Since  2000,  the  efforts  to  homogenise  the  economic  and  legal  space  are  intensified 
through following measures: 
- suspension of regional legislation in contradiction with the Constitution;  
- reinforced inspection of regional laws and creation of a federal database of regional 
laws; 
- redefinition of the distribution of powers and responsibilities between federal, regional 
and  local  authorities.  So,  the  law  95-FZ  (July,  2003)
26  stipulates  the  dominance  of  the 
Constitution and the federal legislation for in the distribution of powers (notably, in cases of 
incompatibilities in Treaties distribution of competences and regional legal acts). The law 
199-FZ  (December,  2004)
27  precises  the  competences  of  the  regions.    The  modifications 
concern social services, forest management and the protection of the environment.  
However, even if the major part of regional acts is now compatible with federal law, 
some discrepancies remain (Chebankova, 2005), both for the legal acts adopted in the past 
and also for newly adopted texts. Second, numerous critics concern the divergence between 
the written law and the real practice in Russia. Finally, one should note that in some cases, 
regional  acts  aimed  to  fill  the  legal  vacuum  and  clarify  the  situation  in  case  of  internal 
contradictions to the federal law (OECD, 2003). 
 
 
3. Firms and the State 
 
3.1. Privatisation and emergence of business elites 
The conditions of the privatisation in Russia were pre-determined during the time of 
Perestroika. Since 1985, were authorized trade intermediation, private and cooperative trade 
and lease of industrial capacities to employees. Several advantages were granted to komsomol 
–  managed  commercial  enterprises
28,  notably,  in  terms  of  their  autonomy  (for  example, 
authorisation to realize intermediation and foreign economic operations) or taxes applied
29. In 
                                                 
23 OECD, 2003. According to other sources (S. Kirienko, Presidential representative in the Volga district), 
only  in  the  Volga  district,  about  2000  local  laws  were  contradicting  the  federal  legislation.  See  "Russia's 
Presidential Districts: A Representative's View", Meeting Reports, Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, 2002. 
24 OECD, 2003. 
25 Another example, law of Yakutia established two national languages, Yakutian and English, without 
mentioning Russian! See "Russia's Presidential Districts: A Representative's View", Meeting Reports, Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2002. 
26 Law 95-FZ of July 4, 2003 relative to the amendment of the federal law on general principles of 
organization of legislative (representative) and executive bodies of the subjects of the Russian Federation (184-
FZ, 1999). 
27 Law 199-FZ (December, 2004) on the amendment of the legislation of the Russian Federation relative 
to the extension of competences of bodies of subjects of the Russian Federation in domains of joint competences 
of the Russian Federation and subjects of the Russian Federation, and on enlargement of the list of questions of 
local importance for municipal districts. 
28 Komsomol stands for Communist youth. 
29 Komsomol economy embraced about 1 million individuals in 1990. Krychtanovskaya (2005: 296-307).   10 
this way, the first stage of privatisation was latent and led to creation of commercial structures 
on  the  basis  of  state  assets  while  granting  specific  economic  rights  to  certain  individuals 
(firms). For example, the reform of 1987-88 transformed the monobanking system into a two-
level  banking  system.  Each  territorial  department  of  the  former  State  Bank  became  a 
commercial  bank,  while  its  managers  and  main  customers  became  later  owners  of  these 
commercial banks
30. As for industrial enterprises, commercial structures were created within 
factories in order to sell produced goods at market prices. 
Officially, the privatisation started in 1992. 
 
3.1.1. Mass privatisation (1992-1994) 
The privatisation program privileged a rapid approach of reforms, aiming to guarantee 
the irreversibility of the transition to market. The speed of privatisation is theoretically based 
on the Coase theorem which provides that once the property rights are private, they will be 
exchanged (sold) unless they find the most productive use (even if the initial allocation was 
irrational)
31. In practice, in order to be accepted, the privatisation program had to satisfy the 
most  important  interests,  that  is  industrial  ministries,  directors  of  industrial  enterprises, 
workers and regional administrations. In order to conciliate the opposition, the process is two-
staged, the first stage being addressed to the employees while the second stage addressed to 
public at large. 
During the first stage, several options for capital acquisition were proposed, and about 
75% of enterprises preferred the option allowing the acquisition of 51% of the ordinary shares 
by the employees of the enterprise because it offered most possibilities to preserve internal 
control over the enterprise
32. 
The second stage of the privatisation consisted in public emission of remaining assets 
through  free  distribution  of  privatisation  cheques  (vouchers)  to  all  the  citizens.  Vouchers 
could  be  exchanged  for  stakes  in  capital,  invested  in  "voucher  funds"  or  sold.  However, 
hyperinflation reduced the real value of the vouchers, while half of voucher funds became 
bankrupt in a few months
33. 
                                                 
30 Except for Vnechekonombank and, partially, Sberbank which remained in state property. 
31 Under condition of zero transaction costs. Coase, Ronald H. (1960) 'The Problem of Social Cost', 
Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1-44. 
32 The Program of the privatisation (1992) proposed three options : 
i) 25% of privileged shares (without voting right) are transferred to workers free of charge; up to 10% of 
ordinary shares may be sold to workers with concessions (price 30% under nominal, payment delayed up to 3 
years); the administrative staff dispose of the right to buy up to 5% of ordinary shares at nominal price;  
ii) all the employees can buy up to 51% of ordinary shares; 
iii) if there is a group of workers who takes the responsibility to respect the plan of privatisation, and 
declares  itself  responsible  for  the  prevention  of  bankruptcy,  and  for  that,  disposes  of  the  mandate  of  the 
employees, then, the members of the group obtain the option to buy 20% of ordinary shares at nominal price 
after one year. At the same time, all the employees (of which the members of the group) can buy 20% of the 
capital with 30% discount from the nominal price, with payment delay going to up to 3 years. 
In all the cases, the workers were to receive 10% of revenues from sales of shares to outsiders. The choice 
offered initially only the first option, rather limiting from the point of view of managers interests. I was enlarged 
under pressures of Russian Union of Industrials and Entrepreneurs. See Goldman (2003: 81). 
33 In February 1994, 620 funds held 60 million vouchers (Goldman 2003: 88). Their massive bankruptcy 
can be explained not only by an inappropriate fiscal regime but also, by insufficient control over their activity 
from the State and investors.   11 
The  privatisation  process  was  not  uniform.  Firstly,  modes  of  privatisation  diverged 
between regions
34. Secondly, according to the Report of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian 
Federation (2004), by summer 1992 (that is, before the start of the privatisation program), 
about two thousand enterprises had been privatized spontaneously preceding the legislative 
process. 
In result, by June, 1994, about 60% of industry was privatised. A major part of assets 
was transferred to insiders at minimum cost. In April 1994, insiders hold 62% of the capital of 
privatised  enterprises  (workers  53%,  direction  9%),  outsiders  hold  21%  and  the  state 
controlled 17% of the capital
35. The assets were priced at pre-inflation prices (at the book 
value of July 1, 1992 multiplied by 1,7, while the hyperinflation reached its peak level)
36. 
Rapid privatisation allowed to bureaucracy and managers to obtain assets at cheap prices and 
to exchange their political power in a hierarchic system against economic power in a market 
system. In doing that, they benefited from their influence in political sphere and within public 
authorities (also at the regional level).  
 
3.1.2. Monetary privatisation (1994-1999) 
Monetary privatisation started in 1994. Formally, at this stage, privatisation had to raise 
budget  revenues  and  attract  investments  for  industrial  restructuring.  In  fact,  this  stage  is 
considered as period of emergence of oligarchs through the loans for shares programs. These 
programs supposed organising of calls for credit for the government, the latter using shares – 
notably of the extracting sector enterprises – as guarantee, and permitted banks to obtain 
attractive enterprises at low prices. 
The procedure of loan for shares was subject of multiple frauds putting doubts on the 
real motives of this process
37. It seems that other factors intervene, notably the political ones 
related to the presidential campaign. In fact, in 1996, Russian bankers created a pact bringing 
their support to B. Yeltsin having a disastrous rating at that time. At the end of the campaign, 
the bankers received considerable economic or political privileges. For example, Oneximbank 
of V. Potanin, the author of the idea of loans for shares, got through this program Sidanko oil 
company and Norilskiy  Nickel metallurgic  giant; the Menatep bank of  M. Khodorkovsky 
acquired Yukos oil company. Also, V. Potanin became the first Deputy Prime Minister just 
after the presidential elections of 1996, and B. Berezovsky (one of the main organizers of the 
electoral campaign) was nominated Head of Security Council in 1996-1997 and the Executive 
Secretary of the Community of Independent States (CIS) in 1998-1999. So, the loans for 
shares  program  contributed  for  ascension  of  several  fortunes,  basing  on  the  principle  of 
personal arrangements. However, Guriev, Rachinsky (2005) underline that the majority of 
                                                 
34 For example, according to the 1994 results, the Major of Moscow, benefiting from exoneration from 
state  control,  collected  more  funds  than  the  whole  of  Russia  (USD  344  million  against  USD  230  million) 
However, his activity doesn't avoid numerous critics for favouring family and friends. Goldman (2003: 90-91). 
35 Yasin (2003: 232).  
36 Another "opportunity" was granted by the right to buy assets leased according to the law of 1989, the 
price being calculated as the capitalisation of leasing payments (fixed before the hyperinflation of 1992). 
37 The credit amount was only slightly higher than the initial assets value (only in four calls from twelve, 
the credit amount sensibly overpassed the initial price). The assets were granted at very low prices. For example, 
in result of the 1996-1997 sale of 7,97% of the capital of the Slavneft oil company, the State got USD 48,8 
million, compared to the market capitalisation of this stake reaching USD 358,1 million. 
The credit amount was very close to the temporarily available funds of the federal budget deposited by 
the Ministry of Finance in the banks participating in the loans for shares program. In other words, banks used 
budget funds to credit the government. Moreover, these funds were not transferred to the Central Bank but were 
reserved on special accounts in the commercial banks (Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, 2004).   12 
oligarchs (at least, from the list established by these authors) have different origins than the 
loans for shares program. 
 
3.1.3. Results of the privatisation 
While  the  major  political  objective  of  irreversibility  of  reforms  was  realized,  the 
economic results are disappointing. The revenues were very limited (see table 1), while the 
production continued to fall. The privatisation program didn't integrate any mechanism for 
enterprise restructuring.  
 
Table 1. Results of the privatisation 
Years  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1999 1999 2000 
Revenues from privatisation (cumulative, % of GDP)  0,8  1,1  1,3  1,5  1,7  2,7  3,3  3,4  3,8 
Part of private sector in GDP (%)  25  40  50  55  60  70  70  70  70 
Source: EBRD (2001:  188). 
In terms of political economy, it was expected that the mass privatisation would create 
incentives for the rule of law (notably, protection of property rights), but that didn't happen. 
On the contrary, numerous imperfections of the legislative base and systematic corruption 
facilitated the appropriation of assets. Meanwhile, the mode of acquisition of assets is of 
prime importance. In fact, the stability of an economic and political system based on property 
rights which are perceived as illegitimate by the majority of population is uncertain. In turn, 
the lack of legitimacy of property rights necessitates a special (thus, personified) mode of 
protection of acquired assets. 
 
 
3.2. Evolution of the business-state relations 
Today,  the  capture  of  the  state  by  private  interests  seems  to  leave  its  place  to  the 
primacy of "national" interest over private strategies. 
 
3.2.1. Concentration of property and "state capture" 
Russia  is  characterized  by  highest  levels  of  property  concentration  in  the  world. 
According  to  the  World  Bank,  the  22  largest  private  owners  control  at  least  20%  of 
employment and 39% of sales
38. According to the study by Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) 
concerning 32 industrial sectors (mining and manufactory activities) which provide 76,5% of 
Russian industrial production or 50% of GDP in 2001, oligarchs contribute for 39% of sales 
in studied sectors (of which 92% of sales of non ferrous metals except aluminium, 80% of 
aluminium, 78% of ferrous metals, 73% of ore, 72% of oil and 71% of automobiles). The 
concentration  of  property  contributes  to  increase  influence  of  individual  firms  on  public 
authorities' decisions related to the economic policy. 
Oligarchs constitute a narrow group searching to acquire practical advantages for their 
firms. In order to characterise the relations between firms and public authorities in transition 
countries, Hellman et al. (2000) propose a measure of the "state capture" phenomenon, which 
is defined as the capacity of firms to influence the formation of the legislative basis by means 
of  informal  payments  to  public  officials  or  politicians.  Captor  firms  search  to  acquire 
                                                 
38 World Bank (2005a: 131), study realized in 2003.    13 
advantages from the state, such as individualized protection of their (weak) property rights by 
means of illicit payments. According to Hellman et  al. (2000), Russia  figures  among the 
transition countries with highest level of state capture
39. However, only 9% of firms can be 
considered as captors
40 (roughly at the average level in transition countries). That supposes a 
high concentration of the state capture in Russia. That corresponds to a strong concentration 
of capital.  
 
3.2.2. Distancing the oligarchs? 
The  1998  crisis  modified  the  Russian  political  economy.  Firstly,  difficulties  of  the 
financial sector to overpass the crisis and reinforcement of industrial enterprises thanks to the 
rouble devaluation had repercussions for the political weight of the corresponding groups. 
Further, the popularity of the newly elected President V. Putin, the end of confrontation with 
the Parliament and economic revival authorized a reorganisation of relations with business 
towards a more equilibrated system based on the dominance of state interests over private 
interests and institutionalisation of the dialogue. 
In 2000, V. Putin proposed the so-called "equal distancing" of the oligarchs. During his 
first meeting with oligarchs in July, 2000, he offered a pact in the following terms: fiscal 
discipline  and  abstention  from  political  interference  against  non-revision  of  privatisation 
results.  The  consequent  adherence  of  oligarchs  to  the  Russian  Union  of  Industrials  and 
Entrepreneurs (RUIE, employers' lobby)
41 can be considered as their response to the growing 
control of public authorities over the economy. Hence, RUIE becomes a club of oligarchs, 
designed to represent their collective interests within public authorities. In 2000, were also 
created  Business  Russia  (Delovaya  Rossia)  and  Support  of  Russia  (Opora  Rossii), 
representing interests of middle and small enterprises respectively. So, clientelism and state 
capture by private interests in the 1990s seemed to leave their place to an institutionalised 
dialogue with groups of enterprises. 
However, the institutionalisation of the dialogue state-firms is not yet achieved. Firstly, 
except for the RUIE which represents about 60% of Russian GDP
42, the unions’ activity is 
still weak. Secondly, its members' interests diverge and certain oligarchs continue to look for 
direct access to the President
43. Finally, the size of firms puts obstacle for equalization of their 
role within groups. 
The Yukos affair marks a retreat of oligarchs from the political scene. However, while 
demonstrating the dominance of state interests, it raised questions related to property rights 
protection, the independence of branches of power, and also of the efficiency of political 
system  based  on  selective  justice.  Even  if  the  main  assets  have  already  been  distributed, 
economic  actors  are  still  engaged  in  a  struggle  for  ownership  and  are  still  powerful  to 
manipulate governmental decisions (Barnes, 2003). Barnes (2003) insists that assets in Russia 
                                                 
39 The unweighted average of the state capture index for transition countries is 20. The index is calculated 
as unweighted average of the percentage of firms affected by corruption in the following domains (indicators for 
Russia are provided in brackets): parliamentary votes on laws (35%), presidential decrees (32%), Central Bank 
mishandling  of  funds  (47%),  court  decisions  for  criminal  (24%)  and  commercial  (27%)  cases,  illicit 
contributions of private interests to political parties and electoral campaigns (24%). Having the final capture 
index of 32, Russia shares the third place with Ukraine and is placed behind Azerbaijan (41) and Moldavia (37). 
40 Captor firms are identified according to their answer to the question "How often do firms like yours 
nowadays need to make extra, unofficial payments to public officials to influence the content of new laws, 
decrees and regulations?". A firm is classified as captor if the answer is "sometimes" or "more frequently". 
41 RUIE was created in January, 1992 but lost its importance in the next years. 
42 Favarel-Garrigues , Rousselet (2004: 100). 
43 Barnes, 2003.   14 
present  more  than  a  simple  economic  value.  They  can  serve  to  dissimulate  profits  using 
different financial schemes, to protect oneself against concurrent firms (notably, strategies of 
diversification  towards  upstream  or  downstream activities),  and  are  also  an  instrument  of 
political  power.  According  to  the  study  by  INDEM  (2005),  the  scope  of  corruption 
considerably increased in 2005 compared to 2001. At the same time, enterprises maintain 
their  influence  at  the  regional  level.  Firstly,  certain  regions  inherited  mono-industrial 
structures of the Soviet Union. The economy of certain cities, towns or regions depends on 
one enterprise, hence, their social importance. Secondly, representatives of enterprises are 
present not only in regional legislatures, but also in the executive power. 
So, the inertia of structures and comportments puts a serious constraint on the passage 
from clientelism to corporatism in State – firm relations. A recent renewal of state "attack" 
proposes a more direct mode of intervention. 
 
3.2.3. Towards a "business capture" 
Two  tendencies  become  visible  nowadays.  Firstly,  one  can  note  a  political  and 
decisional consolidation of the central state. Secondly, it is the economic consolidation within 
a "developmental" state and retreat from liberal economic doctrine which was yet dominant 
during the first Putin mandate
44. 
 The state increases the scope of direct intervention in economy letting  glimpse the 
emergence of the developmental state (Durand, 2007), state capitalism (Radyguine, 2004), or 
even  "business  capture"  (Yakovlev, 2005).  Since  the  Yukos  affair,  the  State  has  restored 
control of the sectors considered as strategic. The latter include not only hydrocarbons, but 
also automobile industry, aeronautics, shipbuilding etc… The part of capitalisation of Russian 
stock market held by the state increased from 20% in mid-2003 to 30% in the beginning of 
2006
45. Finally, the system is consolidated as strategic industries are nowadays managed by 
persons close to V. Putin (like S. Chemezov for Rosoboronexport), and politicians of high 
rang  participate  in  the  Boards  of  Directors  of  large  enterprises  (for  example,  the  Deputy 
prime-minister D. Medvedev is the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Gazprom)
46. 
Economic consolidation engaged by the State consolidates investment capacities  for 
modernisation  projects.  However,  several  questions  remain.  Firstly,  are  we  assisting  the 
emergence of a new oligarchy, the virtuous engagements of the developmental State being in 
fact a simple redistribution of assets between old and new elites? Secondly, the question is 
about  the  efficiency  of  public  manager  as  compared  to  the  private  owner.  Finally, 




4. Integration into the world economy 
The  discussed  political  situation  creates  conditions  for  Russia's  integration  into  the 
world economy. 
                                                 
44 Recently confirmed by the nomination of S. Ivanov (minister of Defence) for the post of the Deputy 
Prime Minister for the development of military-industrial complex and innovations in civil production. 
45 Data OECD. 
46 Noted by Orttung (2006: 3).   15 
4.1. Evolution of the trade policy: towards an administered opening of 
the Russian economy? 
Liberalisation of foreign trade is an integral part of the transition reforms in Russia. 
However, the liberalisation process is rather chaotic and doesn't reveal any coherent strategy. 
In fact, it was tributary of internal (lobbying activity) and external (demands of international 
organizations, restrictions applied on Russian exports by foreign countries etc…) pressures. In 
result,  government  arbitrated  between  sectoral  protection  demands,  budget  revenues 
considerations and demands of international organizations.  
At  the  first  stage,  trade  policy  is  characterised  by  punctual  arrangements  between 
different  interest  groups  and  public  authorities  concerning  not  only  the  level  of  applied 
protection measures, but also, the derogations of these norms, which are on a massive scale. 
 
4.1.1. Trade policy in 1991-1998: individualized "laisser-faire" 
The monopoly of foreign trade was broken during the Perestroika. However, despite the 
abundancy of legal acts, the process of opening lacked of coherence and developed rather by 
trials and errors than on the basis of a clear strategy. Subsequent amendments made obsolete 
precedent  laws,  while  containing  imprecisions  themselves.  Perestroika  engaged  a 
decentralisation  dynamics  without  giving  a  clearly  orientation  to  this  processs,  thus 
consolidating rent strategies. For example, in the beginning of 1991, despite softening of the 
control over foreign trade, the rouble exchange rate(s) was administered creating incentives 
for a flight of exportable production given the differential of domestic and foreign markets 
prices
47, and for the exchange rates arbitrage
48. 
In  general,  with  imports  and  exports,  the  evolution  went  in  opposed  directions: 
increasing import protection and gradual liberalisation of exports (Vercueil, 2002).  
At first, imports were brutally liberalized. All restrictions and tariffs on imports were 
suspended already since January 15, 1992. Further, starting in July, 1992, import protection 
was gradually reintroduced, driven by  growing pressures from industries
49.  In 1992-1994, 
tariffs were reviewed upward four times. In total, average non-weighed tariff passed from 0% 
in the first semester 1992 to 5% in the second semester 1992, 9,5% since April 1, 1993 and 
almost  15%  starting  from  July  1,  1994
50.  Avarage  weighted  tariff  was  lower  and  varied 
between 8% and 12%
51. 
Further, the increase of tariffs continued in May and June 1995 (introduction of specific 
and mixed rates) and in May 1996. However, it was operated rather through the enlargement 
of the tariff base than through a direct increase of rates in order to meet the demands of 
                                                 
47 However, a tax was applied on the exports revenues in order to guarantee supplies for the internal 
market  (98%  on  oil,  exported  only  by  public  enterprises,  70%  for  agricultural  goods,  but  only  10%  for 
manufactured goods). Vercueil (2002: 123). 
48 Obtaining a credit in foreign currency was very advantageous. There were three exchange rates: official 
rate (0,65 roubles for 1 dollar), tourist rate and commercial rate (10 roubles for 1 dollar). O. Krychtanovskaya 
quotes a following example: the Centre of scientific and technical creation of youth "Menatep" (headed by M. 
Khodorkovsky)  received  from  the  State  a  currency  credit  for  1  Mn  doll.  The  dollars  were  exchanged  at 
commercial rate and the credit was repaid in roubles at the official rate. Krychtanovskaya (2005: 305). 
49 V. Chernomyrdin (Minister of gas industry in the Soviet Union and Head of Gazprom in 1989-1992) is 
nominated in Ye. Gaidar government in May, 1992. He becomes Prime Minister in December, 1992, revealing a 
declining influence of liberal economists in formation of the Russian economic policy. 
50 ECE (1994: 77). 
51 According to Konovalov (1994: 40), average weighted rate increased up to 11% at the end of 1992, 
diminished to 8% at mid-1993 and further increased to 12% at mid-1994.   16 
international  organisations  (for  example,  the  average  maximum  was  fixed  to  13%  in  the 
framework of the agreement with the IMF)
52. 
Moreover, since February 1993, imports were subject to 20% VAT, an excise tax for 
certain  products  (alcohol,  tobacco,  cars..)
53,  and,  in  1994-1996,  a  special  tax  designed  to 
protect essential sectors of the national economy
54. 
At the same time, in 1996, certain enterprises or public organisms continued to benefit 
from  tariff  exemptions,  despite  numerous  declarations  stating  renouncement  from  such 
exemptions since 1993
55. Lack of coherence, instability of legal framework and especially 
corruption and numerous exemptions offered to enterprises and regions limited the efficiency 
of imports protection. In 1993, only USD 2,7 billion from USD 41,4 billion of imports were 
imposed by tariffs. The effective rate (ratio of customs revenues to import value) did not 
overpass 6% in 1994. That is about a half (!) of the average weighted tariff rate. 
This leads us to conclude that, in contrast to endogenous trade policy theories which 
relate  the  structure  of  protection  to  industrial  lobbying  activity  and  action  of  the  public 
decision-maker while supposing collective demands for protection and uniform application of 
law to all concerned actors, in the Russian case, we observe pressures emitted by particular 
agents in order to get exceptions to the general norm. The scope of tariff evasion leads to 
consider rather the individualised laisser-faire (individualised liberalism), than the selective 
protection discussed in trade policy theories. At a more general level, this corroborates the 
hypothesis  by  Hellman  et  al. (2000)  on  the  state  capture.  Punctual  arrangements  satisfied 
interests of the trade sector to the detriment of non-competitive manufactory sectors, the latter 
being unable to validate their protection demands. Moreover, tariffs were largely used for 
fiscal reasons and thus, lost their role of trade (and industrial) policy instruments. 
 
As for the export regime, several restrictions (taxes, quotas and administrative controls) 
remained  in  order  to  provide  supplies  for  the  internal  market  in  the  context  of  price 
differentials  favouring  exports,  and  also  to  increase  budget  revenues.  Export  tax  was 
gradually abolished only in 1995-1996. 
Finally, trade policy was biased by measures applied at regional level (for example, 
Maritime region at the Far East taxed imports for fiscal reasons while Kaliningrad benefited 
from fiscal exemptions liberalizing imports). Further, CIS countries could also serve as entry 
points to Russia at favourable conditions as the tariff regime within CIS was not harmonized. 
Finally, individuals' trade free of tariff (shuttle trade) accounted for 20% of Russian imports 
in 1996 putting in question the efficiency of customs border. 
 
4.1.2. Towards an economic opening under control (evolutions since 1998) 
If the end of 1998 and the year 1999 were dominated by the emergency logic after the 
crisis, the State started to restore control over the trade policy since 2000, with the declared 
objectives of reconstruction of national production structures without isolating Russia from 
international markets. However, reforms were aimed firstly to limit fraud and corruption and 
                                                 
52 ECE (1996). 
53 ECE (1994: 75). 
54 At first, 3%, then reduced to 1,5% in 1995. Vercueil (2002: 157). 
55 In 1993, Supreme Council announced cancellation of privileges granted to importers starting on July 1, 
1993. The Law relative to Customs Tariff of January 1, 1994 abolished specific exemptions for enterprises. In 
March 1995, Yeltsin signed a decree abolishing customs privileges. Konovalov (1994: 40), Vercueil (2002: 157).   17 
were globally inspired by a liberal approach. The new import tariff of January, 2001
56 is 
simplified and globally  reviewed downwards.  Its declared objectives are to reduce "grey" 
imports and facilitate imports necessary for the industrial revival in the context of post-crisis 
rouble devaluation. The main directions of the reform were :  
- abolition of a system of 7 levels of ad valorem rates (0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 per cent) 
and adoption of a 4-level system (5, 10, 15, 20 per cent). Tariffs for technological equiments 
are reduced in order to accelerate industrial modernisation; 
- unification of rates within large groups of trade classification. Before 2001, about 25% 
of imports were realised with infractions (notably, misclassification). Diversity of rates within 
product groups
57 left opportunity to classify imported goods into categories submitted to a 
lesser tariff rate.  
The  uniform  tariff  allows  for  the  reduction  of  potential  benefits  of  lobbying  and 
therefore, reduces motivations for lobbying (Tarr, 1998). Indeed, the tariff reform contributed 
to  increase  customs  revenues  by  reducing  the  scope  of  "grey  imports".  According  to  the 
Customs Service, in 1
st semester 2003 as compared to 1
st semester 2000, the increase of tariff 
revenues was 500% for butter imports, 300% for cut flowers, 450% for clothes, 350% for 
refrigerators,  1000%  for  TV  sets,  230%  for  furniture.  More  generally,  in  2001,  customs 
payments increased by 44% compared to 2000 while foreign trade value increased only by 
3,8% (exports diminished by 3% and imports increased by 19,8%)
58. 
However, the reform reduced possibilities for selective protection of nascent industries 
or industries in restructuring. The decrease of the statutory level of protection in Russia was 
not  accompanied  by  compensating  measures  for  domestic  producers  neither  by  sensible 
institutional  improvements  favourable  for  entrepreneurship.  Thus,  it  contributed  to  lock 
Russia in a situation of an open non-competitive economy (except for hydrocarbons). One can 
also question the effectiveness of trade liberalisation in the wake of the WTO accession, as 
negotiations would take the new tariff as a starting point for the ulterior tariff cuts.  
In contrast, on the export side, governmental efforts aim to restore control over raw 
materials and energy exports. So, since February 2002, the tax on oil exports is dependent on 
world oil prices, leading to increase the role of exports in customs revenues (33% in 2002, 
54% in 2004)
59. Hence, Russian trade policy plays a strong fiscal role, with customs revenues 
counting for about 40% of budget revenues. 
The tariff reform was based on a favourable domestic conjuncture (notably, restrictive 
effects of rouble devaluation for imports, and, on the political side, popularity of the Putin 
administration). Actually, in the context of appreciation of the rouble real effective exchange 
rate, industries exposed to international concurrence become more vulnerable. At the same 
time, while the official average tariff is about 11%, the effective rate (import revenues divided 
by the total imports value) is about 7% because of different preferential regimes
60, and further 
cuts are negotiated within the WTO accession. Imports are rapidly increasing, notably those 
of consumption products. 
Therefore,  policy  outcome  doesn't  correspond  to  industry  preferences.  While 
hydrocarbons sectors are submitted to export tax, industrial sectors suffer from insufficient 
                                                 
56 The tariff reform continues in 2001 and is ratified in the new Customs Tariff of January 1
st, 2002. 
57 For example, chiken could be "disguised" in turkey (the latter being submitted to a lower tariff), while 
automobiles could be imported as spare parts, etc. 
58 Data of the Federal Customs Service and Bank of Russia. 
59 Federal Customs Service, www.customs.ru . Access: July, 2005. 
60 World Bank (2005b: 18, fn.8).   18 
public  support.  Recently,  the  public  authorities'  response  aiming  to  revive  industrial 
restructuring originated from two contradictory logics, that is a pursuit of liberalisation (for 
example, introduction of zero tariffs on imports of technological equipments not produced in 
Russia)  and,  at  the  same  time,  direct  state  intervention  through  consolidation  of  strategic 
industries  under  the  state  control.  The  last  year  has  shown  that  the  concept  of  direct 
intervention in the framework of a strong developmental state would dominate neoliberal 
policies. However, in the coming years, Russian economy will remain highly dependent on oil 
and gas exports. 
 
 
4.2. Unchanged foreign trade structure 
The above-discussed political situation and consequent policy decisions contributed to 
destabilise the economy. One can remind a 40% decline of GDP, 50% decline of industrial 
production and 80% fall of investments during 1991-1998. While in absolute figures, Russia 
has currently reached the before-transition production levels, the sustainability of growth is 
dubious. In fact, it is mostly driven by services which are growing at about 10% a year or 
more
61,  boosted  by  increased  consumption  due  to  export  revenues.  On  the  contrary, 
manufactory industries exposed to international competition are globally decelerating (4,8% 
growth in 2006 compared to 9,5% in 2003) face to increasing import flows.  
Russian export structure remains dominated by fuels which accounted for about 49 % of 
exports in 2005. Inversely, the part of manufactured products in Russian imports has been 
increasing up to 72% in 2005 (see table 2). 
 
Table 2. Structure of the Russian foreign trade (percent) 
Exports  Imports  PRODUCT 
1996  2000  2005  1996  2000  2005 
 Primary commodities, including fuels (SITC 0 + 1 + 
2 + 3 + 4 + 68)  58,1  64,7  60,1  25,0  33,0  21,8 
   All food items (SITC 0 + 1 + 22 + 4)  1,8  1,2  1,6  18,0  20,2  16,1 
   Agricultural raw materials (SITC 2 - 22 - 27 - 28)  3,3  3,1  2,8  0,8  2,1  1,0 
   Ores and metal (SITC 27 + 28 + 68)  9,9  9,1  6,6  3,4  6,4  3,2 
   Fuels (SITC 3)  43,1  51,3  49,0  2,7  4,4  1,5 
   Non-ferrous metals (SITC 68)  8,3  7,9  5,1  0,6  1,4  0,6 
 Manufactured goods (SITC 5 to 8 less 68)  26,1  23,0  19,0  44,0  53,9  71,9 
   Chemical products (SITC 5)  5,9  4,9  4,2  7,2  11,4  12,7 
   Machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7)  7,0  5,9  4,1  19,9  22,8  39,9 
   Other manufactured goods (SITC 6 + 8 less 68)  13,1  12,3  10,8  16,9  19,7  19,4 
   Iron and steel (SITC 67)  8,5  6,0  7,0  4,0  4,2  3,7 
 Textile fibres, yarn, fabrics and clothing (SITC 26 + 
65 + 84)  0,9  0,6  0,3  2,5  4,1  2,6 
Total (SITC 0 to 9), per cent  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Total (SITC 0 to 9), millions USD in current prices  88703  103093  241244  60613  33921  98577 
Source : UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics on-line  
 
                                                 
61  Notably,  construction  (14,1%  increase  of  real  production  in  2006  compared  to  2005),  hotels  and 
restaurants (11,2%), financial activities (10,4%), transports and communications (9,4%) and trade (8,7%).   19 
Weak  competitiveness  of  domestic  production  –  reinforced  in  the  context of  rouble 
appreciation driven by high energy prices - leads to increase imports. The value of imports 
has grown by 31,3% in 2006, revealing the vulnerability of the economic equilibrium. The 
evolution of the political economy and the attempt to create a strong developmental state 







While in theory, a market economy and democracy were two indivisible aspects of the 
transition process, in practice, reforms benefited elites, while large  couches of population 
were left aside. Dominance of individual private strategies lead to the fragmentation of the 
central state, both on its "vertical" dimension (relations between federal centre and regions) 
and the "horizontal" one (relations with business), putting in question the effectiveness of 
public  regulation.  Therefore,  the  dominance  of  individualised  lobbying  as  opposed  to 
promotion of collective interests, translates into the individual laisser-faire in the trade policy 
domain. 
This order has been put into question since the end of the 1990s. Reforms are underway 
to  homogenise  the  legal  space  of  the  federation,  reinforce  the  federal  centre  and 
institutionalise the dialogue with enterprises. However, numerous resistances limit the scope 
of real changes. While recent years reveal a movement toward a strong developmental state, 
uncertainties remain as for the effectiveness of its creation (notably, in the context of the end 
of V. Putin’s presidential mandate) and as to the results of this policy in terms of industrial 
and  social  policy.  Meanwhile,  the  economic  (and  hence  political)  equilibrium  in  Russia 
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